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The Wrong Southern Strategy
Academia's Self-Incriminating Standards for "The Party Switch"
One problem with the mythology business is the need to provide evidence to convince skeptics. As we’ve discussed before the Party Switch Myth is no exception; it relies almost entirely on hearsay, innuendo, and vague notions—repeated with dogmatic adherence. Challenge a true believer, and they’ll likely helplessly tell you to "read a book." A common recommendation is the award-winning The Long Southern Strategy by renowned academics Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields.
The problem though is the evidence that the Long Southern Strategy presents only strengthens the notion that there is no convincing evidence, and reveals the desperation found in the Party Switch Myth narrative. We’ve covered the example of the complete distortion of a foundational Barry Goldwater quote, now we’ll explore the mythology around 1968 and Richard Nixon from the introduction of The Long Southern Strategy:
That June, Thurmond publicly professed his support for Nixon, and he whipped up delegate votes on his behalf at the Republican National Convention in Miami when a late campaign by Ronald Reagan left Nixon’s fate hanging in the balance. Thurmond gathered these early white southern Democrats-turned-Republicans and pleaded, “I know you want to vote for Reagan, the true conservative, but if Nixon becomes president, he has promised that he won’t enforce either the Civil Rights or the Voting Rights Acts. Stick with him.” They stuck, giving Nixon the nomination with a first-ballot majority. [emphasis added]
An unbelievable quote perfectly illustrating the author’s thesis… maybe a little too perfect? This unbelievable quote was also used as the singular piece of evidence by The Long Southern Strategy co-author in her 2019 Washington Post article.
This part of the Party Switch Myth hinges on the idea that Richard Nixon secretly promised concessions to segregationists in exchange for their support during the Republican National Convention in 1968. The myth relies on a secret because there is a barren wasteland of primary sources to support it and a vast ocean of evidence that contradicts it. The narrative requires this 1968 secret to serve as a bridge to connect Nixon to Reagan and, ultimately, to whatever current Democratic foe is to be compared with Darth Nixon.
The citation from the scholarly Long Southern Strategy, oddly leads us to a 2016 self-published blog post on the now-defunct “HuffPost Contributor platform,” where “Contributors control their own work and posted freely to our [HuffPost] site.” The quote is attributed to an account under the name Paul “Pete” McCloskey Jr., a Rockefeller surrogate who opposed Nixon’s nomination in 1968. Here is the context of the blog post cited by the Long Southern Strategy:
It was on the second day, I believe, that, while cruising the halls with Barber Conable, we heard a voice emanating from a curtained doorway. We pushed through the curtains to find ourselves at the back of a large room where a small man on the stage was exhorting some 200 people to stand fast for Nixon on the first ballot. These were the relatively few Republicans from the southern states.
The speaker's message was simple and clear. "I know you want to vote for Reagan, the true conservative, but if Nixon becomes president, he has promised that he won't enforce either the Civil Rights or the Voting Rights Acts. Stick with him."
It was Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. His voice was strong and persuasive. That persuasion was successful.
The roll call vote on the first ballot came and towards the end the votes from Washington, I believe, got Nixon over the crucial 575 line. He ended up with 591, 16 over the required number.
McCloskey’s recollection simply does not align with the record. First, it was not Washington that put Nixon over the edge but Wisconsin. Also, Nixon needed to cross 667 not 575 for the nomination.1 Nixon did not end with 591 but 692 after the first ballot.2 While McCloskey's perspective might be interesting, if he were a courtroom witness this testimony would be thrown out. It is irresponsible to take this casual erroneous recollection from a blog and present parts of it as a historical fact—much less present it as a primary piece of evidence.
Citing McCloskey’s recollections shows more than a disinterest in accuracy; it requires a level of partisan desperation only found in academia. The wording McCloskey attributes to Thurmond is self-evidently discrediting—Thurmond wouldn’t have said it, much less in the manner claimed. Moreover, the notion that Nixon would promise not to enforce the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act in exchange for Southern delegates’ support during the 1968 RNC is not only implausible but could only be echoed by someone who has little understanding of the political environment of 1968.
Strom Thurmond’s efforts at the convention were widely covered, yet there is no evidence of such an explosive public pledge. The idea that Thurmond could have made such a statement in front of “200” people without it being reported is laughable, particularly when even McCloskey failed to report it then.
What was reported at the time does not support McCloskey’s claim—it outright disproves it. The anti-Nixon press was eager to catch Nixon in any compromising situation and even went so far as to place a recording device in one of his closed-door sessions. The Miami Herald published a partial transcript of this secretly recorded meeting between Nixon and delegates.3 This transcript contains no indication that Nixon was willing to make the absurd promise of not enforcing the CRA and VRA. Instead, it reveals his insistence that Republicans adhere to the party’s pro-Civil Rights stance.
Harry Dent, often credited as a primary architect of the Republican Southern Strategy, was working for Thurmond at the time and later led Nixon’s campaign in South Carolina. Dent was interviewed about the conversations between Nixon and Thurmond shortly after the RNC. If anyone wanted to offer Southern-friendly news to the Southern voters, it was Harry Dent. Here’s how Dent described the Thurmond-Nixon alliance regarding their views on Civil Rights:
Q – Would you say then the philosophy that he [Nixon] discussed that was his that night was fairly compatible with Sen. Thurmond’s? The Miami Herald, 11 August 1968. |
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